Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making by Camerer, Colin F.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
BOUNDED RATIONALITY IN INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
Colin Camerer
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1029
March 1998
Forthcoming, Experimental Economics.
Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making

Colin Camerer
Abstract
My goals in this paper are: (i) To give a pithy, opinionated summary of
what has been learned about bounded rationality in individual decision mak-
ing from experiments in economics and psychology (drawing on my 1995
Handbook of Experimental Economics chapter); and (ii) mention some promis-
ing new directions for research which would be included if that chapter were
written today.
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I. Utility theories
A. Economic life beyond expected utility
 
Expected utility  was given an official birth in von Neumann and Morgenstern s seminal book on
game theory (1944).  The show that several simple, appealing axioms, characterizing preferences
over risky gambles, imply that the utility of a gamble should be the probability-weighted average
of the utilities of its possible outcomes. 
From the very start (1952) the Allais paradoxes were enough to cast some doubt on expected
utility as a completely general theory of how people value risky choices.1 However, few serious
efforts to  develop formal, simple alternatives were undertaken for about 25 years.  During this
time, decision theorists were mostly busy working out important technical details of expected
utility, like alternative axiom systems and how to measure risk-aversion, and applying the theory
to areas like risk-sharing and asset pricing.
In the late 1970s, various scholars began to propose ways to generalize expected utility to explain
data.  Important work includes Chew and MacCrimmon s (1979) weighted ut ility theory,
Quiggin s (1982) rank-dependent theory, Machina (1982), and of course the prospect theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).2 See Starmer (in press) for a very recent review. 
These new theories piqued the curiosity of psychologists and economists alike, and more theory
followed (notably, implicit expected utility, disappointment theory, skew-symmetric bilinear,
lottery-dependent, and SP/A (security potential/aspiration) theory).  Many papers reported some
data which were consistent with a new theory (and not with expected utility); others merely
featured an obligatory discussion of how their theory could explain the Allais paradox.
In the 1980s, comprehensive experiments designed to test several theories at once were
conducted. The efficiency of these designs is impressive and could serve as a model for
researchers in other areas of how to test several theories which can all explain some basic
2phenomenon but can be distinguished by careful designs (e.g., learning theories in games, see
Camerer and Ho, 1997).  The first such paper is Chew and Waller (1986), who used an ingenious
design suggested in Chew and MacCrimmon (1979). Their basic idea, extending Allais s
approach, was to find sets of pairwise choices such that different theories predicted certain choice
patterns would or would not occur. For example, if you are an expected utility maximizer then if
you prefer getting Y for sure to a p chance of winning X (where X and Y can be any objects, with
X preferred to Y),  you should also prefer a q chance of getting Y to a pq chance of getting X, for
any q in (0,1]. In fact, in this   common rat io   problem (due to Allais) people often shift
preference toward the gamble with a pq chance of X,  as q falls.  
The Chew-MacCrimmon design enables one to use just four pairwise choices to test
simultaneously for common ratio effects, similar   common consequence effects  , and violations of
the axiom of    betweeness   (any probability mixture with a p chance of X and a 1-p chance of Y
should lie between X and Y in preference). My 1989 and 1992 papers adopted this   pattern
paradigm   and extended it, as did Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden, Gigliotti and Sopher, and
several others. The general results showed that  expected utility violations were systematic and
replicable, but violations of some of the new theories could be generated as well.  
Because there were many data sets but few clear conclusions, David Harless and I (1994) showed
one statistical way that data from many different experiments with choice patterns could be
  added up   to draw robust  conclusions. Our technique exploits the fact that in experiments with k
pairwise choices, and 2k patterns (excluding indifference), different theories allow different subsets
of those patterns.  By allowing random error in choices, one can use the observed
patterns of choices to estimate what  fraction of subjects t ruly prefer each pattern, and their overall
error rate. The technique gives a likelihood score to each theory. Likelihoods can be added across
experiments, and adjusted for parsimony by subtracting a penalty for the number of patterns a
theory allows from that theory s likelihood. We applied our technique to 23 data sets consisting of
more than 2,000 choices. The end result is a  menu   of theories one could prefer. Any theory
which is not on the menu is less accurate than an equally-parsimonious theory.  Which theories are
on the menus turns out to depend on whether gamble pairs have the same set of possible
outcomes or different sets of outcomes.  The same-outcomes menu is:  Expected value (most
parsimonious); expected utility; prospect theory (in its original form); and  mixed fanning   3  (least
parsimonious).  The different-outcomes menu is: expected value; prospect theory and mixed
fanning.  
These menu results are powerful because they summarize dozens of comprehensive studies.
The results are so statistically overwhelming that it would take a huge amount of new evidence,
all with surprising new findings that are similar, to reverse the menu ranking.  Furthermore, if a
theory is not on the menu then it is either less parsimonious than an equally accurate theory, or
less accurate than a more parsimonious theory, so there is no sound statistical reason for using it if
one s goal is to describe how people choose.   
Notice that expected utility is not even on the menu when gamble pairs have different sets of
3outcomes.  That means that while expected utility is parsimonious (in the sense that few choice
patterns are allowed), there is no   price   (in the sense of a penalty to log likelihood) which
justifies using this theory instead of a more (prospect theory) or less (expected value)
parsimonious one. If one leans toward expected utility on the grounds of parsimony, a logical
statistical consequence is that you should choose expected value instead. 
Many compet ing theories can be divided into two classes: Those which obey betweenness, and
those which weight probabilities p nonlinearly in some way.  The nonlinear weighting theories
take a sum of outcome utilities weighted by some function w(p) rather than p. The betweenness
theories imply a kind of   local linearity   in probability.  Many clever theories use this axiom but in
our menu analysis, betweeness-based theories are statistically dominated-- they are less
parsimonious and predict worse than competing theories.  
These pattern-based studies aggregate data across many subjects and ignore individual
differences. Some researchers (e.g., Hey and Orme, 1994), have  concentrated on fitting theories
to individuals.  To do so requires a theory of error in choices which has provoked some
interesting work.   These studies usually conclude that a large minority of subjects are best-fit by
expected utility (adjusting for degrees of freedom) and substantial numbers are fit by
rank-dependent or other theories. 
There is some apparent conflict in findings from the two methods-- the aggregated pattern
paradigm tends to reject expected utility in favor of theories with nonlinear weighting of
probabilities like prospect theory, while estimates of individuals show that the most common
individual-level theory is expected utility.  One possibility is that since most of the individual-level
estimation has not used gambles with low probabilities (say, below .10), they do not sample the
region of the gamble space in which expected utility performs worst. A more interesting
reconciliation comes from thinking about aggregation. If half the people in a population obey
expected utility and the other half obey some theory with nonlinear probability weighting, the
aggregate results observed in pattern-based studies will show some degree of nonlinearity and
reject expected utility.  For economic applications which require a single kind of   representative
agent   it is best to assume an agent who obeys, say, prospect theory.  But models which allow
heterogeneity could still have a large number (perhaps a majority) of expected utility maximizers,
along with some people who obey alternative theories. 
We should never return completely to expected utility, even if many subjects are fit adequately by
it, because new theories promise to explain those subjects and the ones who violate expected
utility (and because the best representative-agent theory will not be expected utility). Indeed,
research on alternat ives has moved profitably toward trying to pin down details of alternative
theory and apply them to economic problems. 
There is much progress estimating specific functional forms for weighting of probabilities.  Two
promising forms are the one-parameter forms proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992),
w(p)=pc/(pc +(1-p)c )1/c , and Prelec s (in press) axiomatically-derived form
4w(p)=1/exp(b*(log(1/p))c ), where b and c are constants (and exp(d) is the constant e raised to
the power d).  When b=c=1 both functions reduce to linear probability weighting, w(p)=p, and
when b=1 in Prelec s form the function has a crossover point (where w(p)=p) at 1/e, which has a
nice scientific ring and fits fairly well. There are other two-parameter forms, like the Lattimore,
Baker, Witte (1992) form w(p)=bpc/(bpc +(1-p)c ) , but these parsimonious one-parameter forms
may prove particularly useful for empirical work and theory.
Another new direction is similarity-based choice (e.g., Rubinstein, 1988). Early explanations of
the common ratio effect focused on the fact that probabilities are similar in one pair of choices and
different in another, which seems to shift attention or weight from payoff to probability.  For
example, in the common ratio problem many people choose (.20,$4000) over (.25,$3000) because
the probabilities are similar, but they choose $3000 over (.80,$4000) because the probabilities are
much different (and the difference between winning with .8 and 1.0 probabilities picks up a
  certainty effect  ).  This violates expected utility because the ratios of winning probabilities in
each pair of choice are the same, and only ratios should matter. The intuition that similarity
judgment is driving these paradoxes is captured in nonlinear probability weighting, to some
extent, by having a portion of the weighting curve in which probabilities that are close together
have weights which are disproportionately close (that is, w(.20)/w(.25) is closer to one than
w(.80)/w(1)).   
A more direct approach is to model similarity judgment  as a primitive which influences choice in
some way.  This has been done by Leland (1991) and Buschena and Zilberman (1995). The
similarity-based approaches capture an important kind of psychological intuition which was put
aside while people sought other kinds of theories, but it is worth reexamining because it promises
to connect the generalizations of expected utility more closely to cognitive, attentional processes.  
So far, I have not mentioned a central principle of prospect theory for which there is much
evidence:  People value gains and losses from reference points, rather than final wealth positions.4 
(This idea goes back at least to Markowitz, in the 1950s, Duesenberry on concerns about relative
income, and the psychology of adaptation in psychophysics.) Introducing a dependence on
reference points allows the possibility that gain and loss utility functions have different shapes,
perhaps reflecting a single principle of diminishing marginal sensitivity as one moves away from
the reference point.  Indeed, there is much evidence for convex disutility of losses, which implies
taking risks over possible losses (though this evidence is less robust than concave utility for
gains). It also allows for asymmetry between losses and gains (  loss-aversion  ).  Many studies
suggest that in modest ranges, losses are about twice as aversive as equal-sized gains are
pleasurable.  
I conclude this section with a frank opinion about what economists should do now.  For decades,
economists who use expected utility in various applications, or simply prefer it,  have resisted
switching to an alternative. By now, every scientific argument against switching has been refuted
so it is time to switch. 
One argument against switching is that not enough evidence has accumulated about exactly which
5theory to switch to. The studies above suggest cumulative prospect theory with rank-dependent
weights is a good alternative supported by the preponderance of evidence.  I should add that
while various other theories have proved analytically intriguing and useful for some purposes
(e.g., Machina s local utility analysis, and betweenness-based theories), the full range of
experimental evidence never seriously favored any of these other alternative theories over
cumulative prospect theory. (That  is, while these theories might have been popular for a while, the
popularity was not caused by empirical accuracy.) 
A second argument against switching is that we know how to use expected utility to do theory,
and aren t sure exactly how to use the others. This sounds like laziness.  It took decades of
concerted effort to figure out how to use expected utility-- refining its axiomatic underpinnings,
finding the right measure of risk (the Arrow-Prat t measure)-- and cumulative prospect theory will
require such effort as well. A lot of progress has been made in a short time, particularly on
weighting functions and the degree of loss-aversion. And in any case, the need for new tools is
surely an challenge to be taken up by creative theorists rather than an excuse for using outmoded
tools. 
A third argument is that expected utility is a useful approximation; counterexamples do not
undermine it because approximations are allowed (and even required!) to have counterexamples. 
This apologist claim misses the point that the counterexamples are meant to be raw material to
construct new theory, not merely to   disprove   old theory.  If the new theory can do everything
the old theory can, and then some, then the new theory is equally useful and accommodates
counterexamples; why stick with the old theory?
A strong case can be made for the idea that cumulative prospect theory has now been established
as more useful, because it can do everything expected utility can do and then some.  We should
either move full steam to cumulative prospect theory, or at least treat it and expected utility as
equally interesting competing theories when doing applied economics. 
For example, the concept of risk-aversion embodied in expected utility purports to explain why
there is risk-sharing between individuals and larger entities (like firms or families.   But virtually
any phenomenon of this sort that expected utility can explain can also be explained by cumulative
prospect theory with loss-aversion (if choices have both possible losses and gains), because loss-
averse people will behave a lot like risk-averse people. To the extent that expected utility explains
sharecropping contracts,  insurance purchase, and returns on risky assets (all of which may yield
losses or gains),  prospect theory can explain these regularit ies as well.
Furthermore, there are several well-established anomalies which can be explained by Cumulative
prospect theory but not by expected utility.  Simultaneous gambling and insurance by the same
individuals at all wealth levels cannot be explained by expected utility but can be easily explained
by Cumulative prospect theory (assuming one s current wealth level is the reference point). 
Indeed, a part icipant in the Bonn conference suggested, quite sensibly, that economists would
take prospect theory seriously if it could explain or predict field phenomena which are anomalies
6for expected utility.  In fact, Table 1 shows a list of nine patterns in field data which cannot be
easily explained by expected utility, but which can be naturally explained by assuming either
loss-aversion, reflection effects (convex disutility for losses) or overweighting of low probabilities. 
Most also require assuming a kind of   decision isolation  or  narrow bracketing  (segregation of
decisions from a stream or portfolio of decisions they might naturally be included in; e.g. Read
and Loewenstein, 1995), since otherwise an aversive loss can be absorbed by gains from other
decisions in the portfolio (see Camerer, in press, or the cited papers for more details). 
The nine phenomena cover a wide range of applied economics topics: Savings and consumption
decision (consumption does not adjust downward when people receive bad news about future
income shocks); the unusually-high return premium of stocks over bonds (  equity premium  ); the
tendency to hold losing stocks longer than winners before selling them; downward-sloping labor
supply by cab drivers who set a daily income target and quit when they reach it; asymmetric
elasticities for increases and decreases of the prices of consumer goods; the purchase of actually
unfair insurance against telephone wire repair (toward which people should be approximately risk-
neutral); the tendency of racetrack bettors to favor longshots disproportionately (especially in the
last race of the day); scale-economies in state lotteries, reflecting overweighting of low
probabilities; and the tendency for legal rulings to  appreciate endowment effects by favoring
incumbent  owners  over otherwise-identical newcomers (grandfather clauses, two-tier wage
agreements allowing new employees doing identical work to be paid less, and rulings which award
 custody  of a disputed good to one of two possible owners based on who has held it longer). 
Most of these patterns are well-established in field data and have a common explanation in
decision isolation and some parsimonious combination of cumulative prospect theory ingredients.5 
In addition, at least two of the phenomena-- disposition effects, and downward-sloping labor
supply of cab drivers-- were predicted before they were observed.
Given these observations, it is high time to stop ignoring Cumulative prospect theory in applied
economics and begin investigating it usefulness (or at least, encouraging graduate students to do
so, since as Max Planck said, science progresses funeral by funeral). 
B. Subjective expec ted utility
In standard Ramsey-DeFinetti-Savage subjective expected utility, people choose among acts
which yield consequences in uncertain states.  The probabilities of states are assumed to be
unobservable but are subjective (or   personal  , Savage s term) and are revealed by choices. 
If I prefer an act  which has a good consequence X if state A occurs to  an act which has the same
consequence X if state B occurs, then in subjective expected utility my choice reveals that I think
A is more probable than B.  The difference between subjective expected utility and plain old
expected utility is that subjective probabilities are revealed by choices among acts in the former,
while they are assumed to be objectively given in the latter.
While the idea that choices among acts reveals subject ive beliefs is useful for many purposes,  it
implies that people are not  allowed to shy away from betting on events about which they have
7litt le information, unless their reluctance to bet is manifested in a low subjective probability.
(Intuitively, you can t dislike betting on Italy in the World Cup because you just don t know much
about soccer unless what you really mean is that your subjective probability of Italy s chance of
winning is low.) 
The Ellsberg paradox (conjectured earlier by Knight and Keynes) shows why this restriction can
be too strong.  In the Ellsberg   two-color problem  , people can choose to bet that either a red or
black ball will be drawn from an urn with known composition (50 balls of each color) or an
ambiguous urn with 100 balls in an unknown composition of colors.  Many people prefer to bet
on a red draw from the known-urn than a red draw from the ambiguous urn, and on a black draw
from the known-urn instead of a black draw from the ambiguous urn.  This is a paradox because
in Subjective expected utility, preferring both known-urn bets means the subjective probabilities of
red and black from the known-urn are both higher than the corresponding probabilities of red and
black in the ambiguous urn.  Since the probability of drawing a red or black is one in both cases,
this creates a paradox (if probabilities are additive; more on this below): the known-urn
probabilities P(red) and P(black) can t add to one and both be larger than corresponding
ambiguous-urn probabilities which also add to one.  (Also, the pattern can  t be explained by
risk-aversion because the dollar size of the prize is held fixed so concavity of utility for money
doesn t vary across the two urns.)
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that subjective probabilities revealed by bet choices are a
single beast forced to serve two masters-- they are betting weights which express one s desire to
bet on events, but if they are also probabilities then must also express judgments of  likelihood
(and add up to one). In principle, I don  t see why likelihood judgments should necessarily equal
betting weights. A person could believe the Singapore stock market is equally likely to rise and
fall tomorrow, but have a low weight for betting on either a rise or a fall because she is simply
reluctant to bet on that class of events (compared to betting the same amounts of money on a
better-understood situation like a coin flip).  
The conceptual difference between likelihood and betting weight has  been mentioned many times.
(Savage referred to it but said he did not know  how to capture it formally.) The important
question is whether a reasonably parsimonious framework can generalize subjective expected
utility to account for these paradoxes and introduce a way to disentangle likelihood and betting
weight.
 In my view, nonadditive probability is a reasonable way to go-- that is, allow P(A)+P(B) to be
different from P(A or B)-P(A and B).   As Schmeidler (1989) emphasized, the requirement of
additivity is what catches the probabilities in the pincers of paradox in the Ellsberg problem. 
Additivity forces the complementary red and black probabilities to add to one for both urns
separately, denying the red-state probabilities and the black-state probabilities the right to be
different across urns   
If additivity is relaxed it is easy to wriggle out of the paradox in a way which gets the psychology
8right.  For example, the subjective probabilities of red and black in the ambiguous urn could be 
P(red)=P(black)=.4, while P(red or black)=1 (and of course P(red and black)=0 since they are
mutually exclusive). These probabilities should then be interpreted as betting weights rather than
expressions of subjective likelihood.  Then where is the   missing   .2 probability? The missing
probability is an expression of the extent of one  s aversion to betting at all, or a   reserved belief 
which could be allocated to red or black if more information were available.  Seen this way, the
fact that probabilities are not additive is in fact a modelling advantage, since it gives a way to
measure the extent of one  s aversion to uncertainty. More uncertainty-averse people will have
more reserved belief.  While nonadditive probability seems unruly compared to additive
probability, a lot of progress has been made in some fields (e.g., game theory) in figuring out how
to restrict the nature of nonadditivity and proving interesting results from it (e.g., Ghirardato,
1997). 
Obviously, working with nonadditive probability requires some ingenuity when updating is
involved, but as with non-EU toolmaking, I regard this as precisely the kind of challenge talented
mathematical economists should live for, rather than a reason to cling helplessly to addit ivity.
Modelling probability nonadditively creates a language for understanding some paradoxes in how
people act when information is missing. Frisch and Baron (1988) have suggested that ambiguity is
present when there is known missing information-- an agent knows there is relevant missing
information, which makes her reluctant to act. (Perhaps knowing there is missing information
creates an anticipation of greater regret if the choice turns out  badly.)  The composition of the
ambiguous Ellsberg urn, or trends in the Singapore stock market, are examples of information
which is known to be missing and hence reduces betting weight. For example, people often seem
to demand information in situations where the decisions they would make would not change
regardless of what the information turned out to be.  (Medical overtesting may be an example.) 
From a standard decision theory point of view, demanding information simply to scratch the itch
of not-knowing is  irrational because the value of information is solely derived from the possibility
of changing your decision favorably (in expected value terms).  But from a nonadditive probability
point of view, it  makes sense to demand   useless   information if it relieves aversive ambiguity,
because that relief raising betting weights and raises subjective expected utility. 
The presence of known missing information characterizes many situations in life; assuming people
are averse to taking risks in those situations may therefore help explain lots of phenomena.
Among them are: The   home country   investment bias (people in all countries invest too much in
their own countries, compared to the diversification benefits of invest ing in
internat ionally-diversified mutual funds); excessive brand loyalty (when the costs of experimenting
with new brands is very low); coordination failures in games, where the actions of other players
are ambiguous; and violations of the  Groucho Marx   theorem, in which common new
information creates mutually-profitable trade.  Camerer and Weber (1992) give details and other
examples. 
C.  Probability judgment
9Much research in cognitive psychology suggests that the way in which people form judgments of
probability departs systematically from the laws of statist ics and from Bayesian updating. (This
should not be surprising, because there is no reason to think that evolution of brain processes like
memory, language, perception, categorization, and reasoning would have adapted us to  use a rule
that Bayes only   discovered   a couple of hundred years ago.) Some research points toward
systematic departures, or   biases  , which spring from a small number of  heuristics  , like
anchoring, availability, and representativeness.  
The heuristics-and-biases literature has been useful in forcing us to look beyond the Bayesian
paradigm, but it has not so far produced the kind of  unified, formal alternative to Bayesian
updating that cumulative prospect theory is for expected utility, or nonadditive probability could
be for subjective expected utility.  Nonetheless, I think this is a ripe area for
psychologically-informed theorists to produce a grand new theory and make a big splash.  
As a descript ive theory, Bayesian updating is weakly grounded in the sense that there is little
direct evidence for Bayesian updating which is not also consistent with much simpler theories.
Most of the evidence in favor of Bayesian updating boils down to the fact that if new information
favors hypothesis A over B, then the judged probability of A, relat ive to B, rises when the
information is incorporated.  This kind of monotonicity is consistent with Bayesian updating but
also with a very wide class of non-Bayesian rules (such as anchoring on a prior and adjusting
probabilities up or down in light of the information).
Furthermore, Bayesian updating is actually quite restrictive in two ways. First, a central feature of
Bayesian probability is  exchangeability -- the order in which evidence arrives should not matter.
But usually order does affect judgments (there are well-known   primacy   and   recency   effects in
memory, which affect judgments of probability), implying that people are not Bayesian.  Second,
Bayesian updating assumes a separation between prior probabilities P(A) and judgments of
evidence likelihood P(evidence|A).  But many experiments on  motivated cognition   suggest that
prior beliefs bias likelihood judgments, in the direction of the prior.  For example, in   belief
perseverance   experiments, subjects with different prior beliefs interpret the same information
differently (typically, people who believe something is true are more inclined to interpret
information as consistent with their belief). 
Thus, the case against Bayesian updating is that the Bayesian model has not won clear victories
over simpler rules, and at least two basic properties of the Bayesian model are clearly wrong.  As
with the debates about expected utility, however, the challenge is to find a replacement for
Bayesian updating which codifies the psychological heurist ics in a way that  is formal and
analytically useful, but not too complicated (see Rabin and Schrag, 1997, for a start).   I am
optimistic that clever decision theorists can think of a way to do it, if serious attention were
turned in that  direction (as it has been in developing post-expected utility and post-subjective
expected utility frameworks). Perhaps moving away from the concept of state spaces, in which
information is represented by state-space partitions, toward something nonpartitional like modal
logic, is the right way to go (e.g., Rubinstein, 1997).
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I conclude this Handbook-recap section with a brief editorial.  Expected utility, subjective
expected utility, and Bayesian updating are wonderful normative theories, in the sense of
providing good advice which is often surprising and counterintuitive. As a result, we should not
expect  people to use them in everyday decision making. If they described what we do naturally,
they would not help us do better.
Furthermore, psychologists and behavioral economists have developed formal alternatives to these
building block principles which are promising replacements.  Expected utility, subjective expected
utility, and exponential discounting of future utilities could be replaced, in the textbooks our
children will learn economics from, by cumulative prospect theory, nonadditive probability, and
hyperbolic discounting (more on the latter below). 
Given the strong a priori arguments against descriptive accuracy of these theories,  and the
availability of interesting formal alternatives, it is amazing how much experimental work in
economics has been concerned with   defensively   trying to account for artifactual explanations
for apparent violations of  the theories, or find conditions under which violations go away. 
Defensive research has made few dents in the basic findings and produced few surprises.   At this
point, other kinds of experiments are clearly more useful.   Constructive   experiments take
alternative theories seriously and explore their implications or measure parameter values (e.g.,
Myagkov and Plott, 1998).   Competitive   experiments carefully explore which of several
alternative theories is better than an old one (like the  horse race  experiments on expected utility
mentioned above).  Market-minded   experiments ask whether individual-level phenomena are
attenuated, or perhaps made worse, by various kinds of institutional aggregation like making
decision in groups or trading in markets (e.g., Camerer, 1987; Ganguly, Kagel and Moser, 1998). 
Experimenters interested in studying bounded rationality of individuals should do more
experiments in these latter three categories and do fewer defensive experiments.
II.  New directions
This section is an addendum to my Handbook chapter, discussing recent research directions not
covered there in much detail.  
A. Choice over time
 
Most choices require people to weigh current costs and benefits against future ones.  The
standard model of such intertemporal choices assumes people have a discount rate r and apply a
discount factor to time t utilities which is an exponentially declining function of t, (1/1+r)t.  As
Loewenstein (1992) pointed out, this model compresses a long history of thought about the
factors which affect intertemporal tradeoffs into a formula which is surely too simple.  Many of
these excluded factors have been shown to affect revealed discount rates.  For example, people
can delay gratification longer (lowering their revealed discount rates) if the gratifying object is not
in front of them, or if they simply close their eyes or think about something else.  People often
exhibit negative discount rates, preferring to delay pleasurable outcomes (a hot date) and speed
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up bad ones (dentistry). Loewenstein (1987) attributes negative discounting to the pleasure
derived from savoring the anticipation of something good, and the dread of worrying about
something bad. And visceral factors like emotions, hunger, and fatigue change discount rates
dramatically, and temporarily (Loewenstein, 1996).
The most striking, regular departure from exponential discounting is found in a large body of
experimental research, mostly conducted with nonhuman animals but frequently replicated with
humans, showing that the discount function is  close to hyperbolic, (1/1+ct)-b/c, rather than
exponential (see Ainslie, 1975).  (As c approaches zero this function approaches an exponential so
it strictly generalizes the exponential approach.) The hyperbolic function is more steeply sloped
for near-term tradeoffs than for long-term tradeoffs; that is, hyperbolic discounters act as if they
are much more impatient delaying rewards from now to the near future than they expect to be for
future delays of equal length.   The evidence for hyperbolic discounting is overwhelming:  There
are no tests in which the exponential structure beats the hyperbolic form in a direct competition
(when there is enough power to distinguish the two).   
A one-parameter form which is approximately hyperbolic, and often easier to use analytically, is a
model in which the discount factor is b/(1+r)t  (see Phelps and Pollak, 1968).  If b<1 this function
discounts immediate delays more dramatically than exponential, because current utility gets a
weight of one while utility one period from now gets a weight b/(1+r).  But this form discounts
two different delays from the current period, t1 and t2, using exponential discounting because the
discount factors are b/(1+r)t1 and b/(1+r)t2 so the relative discount factor is exactly the same as
with exponential discounting (since the immediacy premium factor b divides out). Of course, if
b=1 then the two-parameter form reduces to standard exponential discounting.
Besides its descriptive superiority, and reasonable parsimony (adding just one parameter),
hyperbolic discounting provides a way to characterize problems of self-control: Since hyperbolic
discounters are very impatient now, but act as if they expect to be patient in the future, they will
indulge in current temptations which are wonderful now but costly later-- eating unhealthy foods,
watching TV rather than exercise, putting off work-- because they expect to  resist those
temptations in the future.  Obviously, hyperbolic discounters exhibit dynamic inconsistency
because they will plan future behaviors they systematically do not carry out.   While this is, of
course, normatively undesirable, it is descript ively ubiquitous. (Many people you know behave
this way-- probably including you!)
I think economists have resisted using hyperbolic discounting for three reasons: (i) Ignorance
about the overwhelming empirical superiority and parsimony of hyperbolic discounting; (ii)
confusion about the normative vs. descriptive appeal of dynamic consistency; and (iii) uncertainty
about how to move away from the exponential model and still do analytical economics. 
Point (ii) reflects a common methodological prejudice in positive economics (mentioned above): 
Many of the bedrock rationality assumptions economists cling to as modelling principles 
complete preferences, expected utility, Bayesian updating, exponential discounting, rational
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expectations-- are wonderful normative principles; people who understand them and manage to
apply them will live better lives and make fewer big mistakes.  But precisely because these
principles are  normatively useful, we should not expect them to be universally obeyed in everyday
choices or even to be conveyed to consumers by social influences and by markets for advice.  For
example, the fact that people would like to avoid temptat ions, and plan or hope to do so in the
future, is hardly a reason to think they do or that social influences, education, and market forces
will necessarily solve their self-control problems.  
Hyperbolic discounting addresses the   how to do economics?   concern (iii) by offering a
two-parameter functional form which can account for individuals who are dynamically consistent
and for those who aren  t. Recent research demonstrating that the quasi-hyperbolic mode can be
used to do economic theory includes Laibson (1997) and O Donoghue and Rabin (in press). 
B. The adaptationist (or evolutionary psychology) program
 Evolutionary psychology  is a new (or rekindled) approach which has some implications for
decision research. Evolutionary psychologists ask:  Why might decision rules have 
evolved or adapted as they did?  This approach has, so far, been mostly an exercise in post facto
rationalization of observed patterns.  For example, the special properties of face recognition
(compared to other kinds of object recognition) can be explained as an adaptation in
hunter-gatherer economies which allowed primitive people to share with (recognized) friends and
avoid enemies.  Some studies with the Wason 4-card logic problem suggest that people are better
at solving logic problems when they are cloaked in a context of cheating-detection, which is often
taken as indirect evidence that people have some specialized cheating-detection  module   which
adapted to solve hunter-gatherer exchange problems. In the Wason problem, there are four cards
which have a letter on one side and a number on the other.  Subjects see cards which read  A, K,
4, and 7.  Subjects are asked which cards they would turn over to discover any violations of the
rule   If there is a vowel on one side of a card, there must be an odd number on the other side  . 
The common pattern is to turn over A and 7. However, turning over 7 does not matter, because
the rule is not falsified even if there is no vowel on the other side. And subjects should turn over
4, because the rule is false if there is a vowel on the other side, but most subjects do not realize
this.  However, the problem can be recast as a test of the rule   If a person drinks alcohol in a bar,
they must be over 21", and the objects to be inspected are a person drinking ginger ale, a person
drinking vodka, a 19-year old, and a 23 year-old. (This is logically equivalent to the 4-card
problem).  Then subjects immediately realize that they should check the age of the vodka drinker,
and what the 19-year old is drinking.
Differences in male and female pair-bonding, violence toward children, and sexual behavior also
have obvious potential explanations as adapted outcomes (For example, the prediction is that men
will invest less in their children than women do, and pair-bond with the mothers of their children
only reluctantly, because it is obviously easier to verify who a child s mother is than to verify who
the father. In addition, stepfathers will harm their stepchildren at much higher rates than their
natural fathers do, which seems to be true). 
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While evolutionary psychology is a fruitful way to rationalize phenomena we observe, predict ing
new phenomena is much harder. Prediction requires one to understand the environment in which
adaptation took place, to understand (to some extent) the cognitive mechanisms which resulted
(including perhaps the time scale on which selection and genetic transmission took place), then
predict how the adapted mechanism will perform in a modern environment.  This chain of
reasoning is very hard to do by working forward, and incredibly easy to do in reverse. The reverse
postdict ive strategy often results in   just-so   stories which explain a little too glibly why a
behavior adapted, often ignoring constraints or negative side effects of the adaptation.
Furthermore, in the end evolutionary psychology will explain only a small portion of variance in
economic behavior if  brain structure adaptations are swamped by cultural adaptations,
socialization, individual differences, etc.
Having sounded those pessimistic notes, I think the adaptationist program is well worth exploring.
The adaptationists simply prefer to focus on the half-full part of the glass of cognitive ability,
asking how intelligent simple rules can be, rather than the half-empty part, looking at shortfalls
from full rationality as a way of discovering simple rules.  Both perspectives are useful.  
A related development is mathematical exploration of the evolutionary foundation of preferences.
The idea in this work is to assume that decision rules evolve to solve some specific objective (e.g.,
maximize reproduction of genes), and are transmitted by genetic or cultural evolution, or
imitation, then determine mathematically which rules will survive (e.g., Canning, 1997; Cubitt and
Sugden, in press).  The contrast between this approach and traditional decision theory is
remarkable.  A decision rule is traditionally justified or   explained   by the set of axioms which
imply it; if the axioms seem plausible then the rule is too, by implication.  To an evolutionist this
reasoning reflects a kind of creationism-- a rule s existence is not explained until its ability to
survive natural selection has been established.
C. Case-based decision theory
I am a fan of the   case based decision theory   of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995).  To convey the
spirit of case-based theory, imagine that you never learned about expected utility and subjective
expected utility theories which value choices by sums of probability-weighted outcome utilities. 
Now consider how you might decide to hire a colleague, buy a house or choose a movie to see. In
case-based theory you do so by comparing the current group of options (or   case  ) to previous
groups.  The value of options is computed by considering how well different actions that were
chosen in the past actually performed, and weighting those historical outcomes by the similarity of
those actions to the current action under considerat ion.  To do this, you compare a possible
colleagues to others who are like her, taking an average of the previous successes and failures
weighted by similarity of those previous people to her.6  In buying a house, you compare the
house to others in the neighborhood (  comparables   in real estate jargon) or to other houses you
have seen or lived in. 
Standard subjective expected utility looks ahead-- parsing the world into possible states with
different consequences and weighing those states by their likelihoods.  In contrast, case-based
14
theory emphasizes the past as a way of guessing the future, parsing the world into actual
consequences and weighting them by similarities.  For many types of decisions, the logic of
similarity-based historical comparison is just more plausible as a description of how people think
(and respects the large literature in cognitive psychology on reasoning and similarity).  When you
choose a movie, house, or colleague, do you think about possible consequence states and weigh
their likelihood?  Or do you instinctively compare each movie, restaurant, or colleague to others
you have seen and liked or disliked? You almost surely do some of the latter. 
There is surprisingly little research on case-based theory other than a series of papers by Gilboa
and Schmeidler extending the theory (allowing similarity between acts, as well as cases), showing
the conditions under which it will converge to expected utility, and pointing to applications like
consumer choice.  Indeed, case-based decision theory is both a general language for thinking
about the components of choice, and a theory of how preferences are formed over time (since
preferred choices will change with one s historical experience).  It seems ripe for application to
decision making in domains where guessing state probabilities and consequences is awkward but
recalling similar past  cases is natural. For example, lawyers have staunchly resisted the
introduction of probabilistic reasoning into legal judgment. Instead, they tend to think about legal
cases by  judging how well threads of a woven fabric of precedent apply to a current case.  Since
similarity to previous cases plays such a central role in legal reasoning, case-based theory could be
very useful in characterizing how judges and juries make decisions or helping them do so more
systematically (see Sunstein, 1997). 
D.  Hedonics
In centuries of philosophical thought, before the revealed preference approach came to  dominate
economics, the concept of utility had various meanings which would seem strange or even
nonsensical to modern economists.  For example, many philosophers thought of utility as
sensation of momentary pleasure (and pain), rather than a number used to index choices of
commodity bundles.   Reopening the exploration of these distinctions among types of ut ility is the
goal of research on   hedonics  , or the   Benthamite program   begun by Daniel Kahneman in
various collaborations (e.g., Kahneman, Sarin and Wakker, 1997). 
From the point of view of hedonics, revealed preference concentrates obsessively on   decision
utility  -- the utility revealed (tautologically) by what is chosen, or decided.  But in principle, one
could also distinguish this from   experienced utility  -- sensational measurements of on-line,
real-time pleasure and pain-- which recalls an older use of the term   utility  .  The two kinds of
utility will differ before people have learned what they like (children eating too much candy or
reaching toward an open flame). Decision and experienced utility also differ when people 
routinely choose things they do not take physical pleasure from, like people with compulsive
disorders washing their hands obsessively. This is not to say that people will stupidly choose
goods which make them miserable over and over (though some might), but simply that a
distinction can be drawn between deciding and experiencing, and explored empirically. 
Having established a possible distinction between decisions and experiences, one can also 
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distinguish   forecasted utility   (a forecast of experienced utility, which is likely to be closely
related to decision utility but conceptually different) and   remembered utility  . 
Kahneman makes a persuasive case that we should distinguish these types of utility and explore
them empirically.  For example, forecasted utility is important because virtually all choices require
people to forecast the utility they will get from an experience they will have in the future, rather
than immediately.  The time gap between choice and consumption varies from minutes (ordering
at speedy Baja Fresh) to hours (deciding to rent   Casino   later tonight) to days (planning a
weekend outing to Santa Anita racetrack) to months (choosing what to teach next year) to years
(building a house) to decades (planting an oak tree, getting a tattoo, bearing a child).  Seen this
way, the problem of forecasting what you will want in the future is the essence of choice.  There
is simply no reason to believe that revealed (decision) utilities, perhaps based on remembered
utilities, will necessarily be unbiased forecasts of experienced utility.  Evidence has already
accumulated that there are special errors in forecasting future tastes (see Loewenstein and
Schkade, in press), and this crucial problem for economics should certainly be explored further.
E.  Neurobehavioral economics
Imagine a group of astronomers who theorize about the moon, using only observations from a
weak telescope, or geologists who theorize about the earth s core using only evidence from
earthquakes and volcanos.  Suddenly they have a spaceship, or a huge drill.  Should they use these
tools to check whether the assumptions they make about the moon and the earth-- previously
beyond their observational reach-- are correct or not?  Of course they should!
I think economists will soon be in a similar position with respect to the human brain.  Tremendous
advances in genetics and brain scanning are making possible a profound leap in understanding the
details of brain mechanisms.  
A standard mantra in economics is that  assumptions about individual rationality like completeness
of preference, linearity of  probability weights, constrained maximization, exponential discounting,
and rational expectations are only   as if   stand-ins for some (incompletely) specified theory in
which learning, advice, or market forces create prices and quant ities like those which would result
if individuals obeyed these assumptions. But why not take these assumptions seriously and ask
whether brain mechanisms exist which  lead to the assumed behavior and, if not, what behaviors
do those mechanisms cause? 7  Some kinds of economic rationality may turn out to be consistent
with well-established brain mechanisms, and in other cases neuroscientific evidence will suggest
mechanisms which imply different assumptions.  For example, I am confident we will see
neuroscientific evidence for the hyperbolic model of discounting, or something akin to it, rather
than for dynamically-consistent exponential discounting, as described in section II.A above.
Two examples will illustrate, and perhaps whet the reader s appetite.
(i) Research on the  neural computation of utility   tries to determine the neural mechanisms which
encode liking and compare liking of two different rewards to determine which is better (given
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prices).  Evidence from rats (and some earlier evidence from humans)   implicates  , as the
neuroscientists say, electrical brain stimulation reward and dopamine neurotransmitter levels in the
limbic system as elements of such a system (e.g., Shizgal, 1997).  Brain stimulation reward does
not seem to satiate, substitutes easily for both food and drink (which do not substitute well for
each other8), and seems to affect brain centers   downstream   from the centers which are activated
by food and liquid.  Thus, brain stimulation reward has ideal properties to be a    common
currency   or   brain money   which can be used to compare two rewards which are physiologically
different (like food and drink), like a kind of neurochemical utility.
(ii) Neuroscientific evidence is likely to improve economic theories of addiction.  In the view
which appeals to most  economists,  addiction is simply an extreme case of an intertemporal,
intrapersonal spillover (or   internality  ) in which past  consumption of a good influences present
utility from consuming it (Becker and Murphy, 1988).  The brain evidence is roughly consistent
with this view, but much more precise (and surprising) about the details of the internality. 
Most addictions produce a combination of craving or withdrawal (displeasure associated with
  coming down   from using a drug--or  a disutility from not consuming) and enhanced tolerance
(or reduced utility from a fixed dose). These effects can be observed in great neural detail (e.g.,
measured dopamine levels) in rats and other animals who, interestingly, can become addicted to
all the chemical substances humans become addicted to. (This parallelism alone suggests that
physical addiction is a primitive process which evolved in animal brains a long time ago and still
exists in the   old   part of our brains.) 
A more neurally detailed version of the economic model could incorporate these processes,
allowing three wrinkles: First, there are substantial individual differences in addictiveness. Second,
it is not clear whether addicts realize they are becoming addicted or act   rationally  , in a sense of
stable foresightful preference, during the times when they are either high or craving (as is assumed
in the Becker-Murphy view). 
The third wrinkle is truly amazing. Recent research indicates that while addicts develop a
dependence on the drug itself (which results in unpleasant craving and perhaps painful
withdrawal), they can also learn to associate drug use with environmental cues like drug use
rituals and the place, time, and people with whom they use.  The brain   learns   to expect a drug
dose to follow when these cues are present (as in classical Pavlovian conditioning, in which dogs
learn a bell is followed by food, so that the bell produces salivation). In a homeostatic   opponent 
process, like a thermostat, when the cue is observed the brain knows opiates are coming and turns
off naturally-produced opiates, which produces craving.  As a result, simply seeing an
advert isement, an old drug friend, or a piece of drug paraphernalia, can act ivate craving and
spontaneously increase demand for a drug.  For example, my colleague Mr. G. used to smoke
only in his car.  After quitting, he would crave a smoke when he got into the car, but not at other
times.  Similarly, many Vietnam veterans who were addicted to heroin during the war were able
to quit easily when they returned home to America (where the environmental cues surrounding
them during their wartime heroin use were absent). 
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Many drugs are easy to withdraw from slowly (e.g. , a clinician can get a user off heroin painlessly
by   tapering   doses downward over 30 days) but long-term abstinence is hazardous because
environmental cues can trigger a craving which induces relapse into drug use.  Cue-based
conditioning greatly complicates the Becker-Murphy view, because it means that  a desire for the
drug (expressed as increased marginal utility) can come from sources other than one s own
previous consumption (see Laibson, 1996). Past-consumption internalities are accompanied by
externalities, which takes some responsibility for consumption out of the addict  s hands and
undermines the addict s ability to consume addictive substances rationally. 
III. Conclusion
Happily, the exploration of procedural (or bounded) rationality of individuals as they make
economic decisions is an idea whose time has finally come. Interesting research is happening in
many different areas.  This paper has mentioned a few but left out many others. 
Influenced by computer science and automata models, theorists explore models in which agents 
rationality bounds are computational or result from limited memory (e.g., Rubinstein, 1997).  
Computational economists interested in very complex systems, liberated by computing power
from the shackles (and discipline?) of analytical tractability, posit many types of  limitedly-rational
agents and study how their simple behavior leads to emergence of something more complex and
possibly lifelike. 
Game theorists have essentially abandoned the naive idea that equilibration arises from mental
tatonnement by hyperrational players who   figure out   an equilibrium in their heads, and have
turned instead to the formal details of evolut ionary and adaptive equilibration by players who
evolve (Weibull, 1995), or learn from experience (Camerer and Ho, 1997) or from each other.  
Macroeconomists are once again interested in rule-of-thumb consumption (cf. Keynes s
consumption function) and habit formation, and various ways to model learning (Sargent, 1994).
Business is booming in   behavioral finance  , which seeks to explain price and volume movements
which strain credibility of efficient-markets explanations, using models in which traders are not
always utility-maximizing and Bayesian (e.g., Thaler, 1995).  
Environmental economists are energetically trying to measure consumer preferences for
nonmarket   contingently valued   goods like clean air.  Standard theory gives no reason why the
value people place on these goods should be any harder to elicit than, say, their home equity or
college GPA.  But eliciting consistent, reasonable contingent valuations from people seems as
slippery as asking them about whether they d prefer to visit Mars or Venus, or the pH of the dirt
in their yards.  The difficulty of eliciting reasonable valuations has made many economists realize
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people often do not have well-formed preferences as standard theory assumes. Instead, they
  construct   a preference; they try to answer difficult questions about their own valuations like
they approach the problem of figuring out an unknown quantity, like guessing the distance to the
moon. 
All these developments in important areas of economics mark progress away from a purely
rational-choice model which is normatively appealing but descriptively incomplete, toward a more
general conception (which, of course, should include rational models as a special case when
possible).  It means we can spend less time attacking and defending overly simplified
rational-choice theories and spend more time doing what we had in mind all along-- better
economics.
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Endnotes
1 Morgenstern (1979) said he and von Neumann never intended expected utility to apply to
gambles with low outcome probabilities (  For example, the probabilities used must be within
certain plausible ranges and not go to .01 or even less to .001, then be compared to other equally
tiny numbers such as .02, etc.  ).  He gives no hint , however, what  kind of theory should apply
there.
2 Incidentally, the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) paper on prospect theory is one of the most
widely-cited papers ever published by Econometrica. 
3 Fanning out refers to  Machina  s (1982) clever conjecture that many choice paradoxes can be
explained by indifference curves which   fan out   when plotted in the Marschak-Machina triangle. 
This means that people act as if they get  more risk-averse  when choosing among better gambles. 
Mixed fanning allows them to get more risk-averse in one range, then less risk-averse after that. 
It ends up on the   menu   largely because it allows almost any patterns and is therefore least
parsimonious. 
4 A related statement, of interest in studies on savings and consumption, is that  different
categories of wealth may be  mentally accounted   for differently rather than combined into a
single net worth figure (see Thaler, in press). 
5  It  is true that in each case, special modifications to the standard expected utility approach could
conceivably explain the anomaly-- survivorship bias at the market level might explain the equity
premium, participat ion bias among cab drivers might explain downward-sloping labor supply,
unobserved heterogeneity among consumers might explain asymmetric price elasticities, and so
forth.   But  these modifications are truly ad hoc because a special modification to expected utility 
is needed for each phenomenon, which leads to an applied version of expected utility which is
crusted with special features like a boat s hull is crusted with barnacles. Decision isolation plus
prospect theory can explain them more parsimoniously.
6 Technically, I am allowing similarity between acts as well as between cases, which seems much
more natural for examples like these. 
7 The evolutionary-foundations approached referred to at the end of section II.B seems to have
already captured the curiosity of many economic theorists.  This suggests (by revealed preference!)
that in principle, economists are open to study the foundations or origins of preference.  But by
asking which behavioral mechanisms might have survived natural selection, the evolutionary
approach leapfrogs back one long causal leap.  Neurobehavioral economics stops in the middle of
that causal leap to simply ask how the brain works, before asking why it might have evolved to
work that way.
8 Substitutability is measured in the standard way, by a cross-price elasticity, where the   price   of
25
food is the number of lever taps is the amount of   work   an animal is required to perform to
receive a reward. 
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Table 1: Nine field phenomena inconsistent with EU, consistent with cumulative prospect theory
DOM AIN REGULARITY DESCRIPTION TYPE OF
DATA
ISOLATED
DECISION
INGRED-
IENTS
REFERENCES
Macro-
economics
Insensitivity to
bad income
news
Consumers do not cut
consumption when they
get bad income news
Teachers 
earnings,
savings
No isolation Loss-
aversion,
reflection
Shea (1994);
Bowman,
Minhart and
Rabin (1996)
Stock
market
Equity
premium
Stock returns  are too
high, relative to bond
returns
NYSE stock,
bond returns
Single  yearly
return (not
long-run)
Loss-
aversion
Benartzi and
Thaler (1995)
Stock
market
Disposition
effect
Hold losing stocks too
long, sell winners too
early
Individual
investor
trades
Single stock
(not portfolio)
Reflection
effect
Odean (in press)
Labor econ Downward-
sloping labor
supply
NYC cabdrivers quit
around daily income
target
Cabdriver
hours,
earnings
Single day
(not week or
month)
Loss-
aversion
Camerer et al
(1997)
Consumer
goods
Asymmetric
price elasticities
Purchases more
sensitive to price
increases than to cuts
Product
purchases
(scanner data)
Single 
product (not
shopping cart)
Loss-
aversion
Hardie, Johnson, 
Fader (1993)
Insurance Buying phone
wire insurance
Consumers buy 
overpriced insurance
Phone wire
insurance 
purchases
Wire risk (not
portfolio)
Overweight
low p(loss)
Cicchetti and
Dubin (1994)
Horserace
betting
Favorite-
longshot bias
Favorites are underbet,
longshots overbet
Track odds Single race
(not day)
Overweight
low p(win)
Jullien and
Salanie (1997)
Lottery 
Betting 
Demand for
low-p lotteries
More tickets sold as top
prize rises, p(win)  falls
State Lottery
sales
Single lottery Overweight
low p(win)
Cook and
Clotfelter (1993)
Law Grandfather
clauses, two-tier
wages, time-
held rules
Endowment effects:
 Owners   protected
compared to identical
newcomers
Legal rulings Single item or
income 
stream
Loss-
aversion
Cohen and
Knetsch (1992)
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